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Supplemental Appendix
This appendix contains supplemental proofs for “Policy-Specific Information and Informal Agenda
Power.” The appendix is divided into three sections. The first proves that our main substantive
results hold if the valence of the status quo is strictly greater than zero. The second provides a
complete set of results for the committee composition game; these results are used to generate the
example in the main text. The third analyzes a variant of our model in which valence is transferable
by the committee but not expropriable by the floor.
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Status Quo with Strictly Positive Valence
We show that if the status quo has strictly positive valence vq > 0 then our main substantive results
still hold.
Transferable valence If vq > 0 then this valence is transferable to any other policy, even absent
any committee effort. This is equivalent to a model in which we redefine the committee’s valence
return probability distribution for v ∈ [0,∞) to be a different distribution G (·) on [0,∞) such
that G (0) = F (vq), and for z > 0, G(z) = F (z + vq). Informally G (z) is the probability that the
difference between realized valence v and status quo valence vq is less than or equal to z. Using
G (·) the model satisfies all of our original assumptions, and our results go through substantively
unchanged.
Policy-specific valence Suppose the status quo has policy-specific valence vq > 0. There are
two possibilities. One is that the floor prefers (vq, q) over (0, 0) , in which case the closed rule and
open rule are equivalent, because even under an open rule (0, 0) is not a relevant policy option.
The second possibility is that the floor prefers (0, 0) over (vq, q). In this case, under an open rule
the committee’s investment decision is the same as in the policy-specific model in the main paper.
Under a closed rule, the committee has less incentive to invest in valence acquisition than under an
open rule. The reason for this is two-fold. First, as shown in the main paper it has less incentive
to invest if the status quo is (0, q) than if the status quo is (0, 0). Second, it has even less incentive
to invest if the status quo is (vq, q) than if it is (0, q). This is true because 1) the probability that
the valence return will be sufficiently high so that an arbitrary target policy x˜ defeats the status
quo is greater when the status quo is (0, q) than when it is (vq, q), and 2) if the policy x˜ were to
pass given either status quo the gain to the committee is greater if the status quo is (0, q) than if
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it is (vq, q).
The final step of the proof is to show that the target policy that the committee works on if the
status quo is (vq, q) is worse for floor than the target policy under an open rule.
Lemma 4 For any status quo (vq, q) that the floor prefers to (0, 0), the target policy is strictly
more extreme than the target policy under an open rule.
Proof. We begin by introducing additional notation. Let x˜ (vq, q) denote the optimal target policy
under a closed rule when the status quo is (vq, q). Note that this suppresses the dependence of x˜
on the committee’s ideal point xc. Also, note that the target policy under an open rule is x˜ (0, 0) .
In addition, let v¯ (x˜; vq, q) denote the valence cutoff when the status quo is (vq, q), i.e.,
v¯ (x˜; vq, q) = λf (|x|)− λf (|q|) + vq,
and note that v¯ (x˜; vq, q) = vq + v¯ (x˜; q).
The first step of the proof is to argue that x˜ (vq, q) ∈ [q, xc]. Clearly x˜ > xc is dominated by
x˜ = xc. Furthermore x˜ < q is dominated by x˜ = q. If the target policy is x˜ = q then the outcome
is (vq, q) for a realized valence v ≤ vq and (v, q) otherwise, and if the target policy is instead x˜ < q
then the outcome is (vq, q) for v ≤ v˜ (x˜; vq, q) < vq and (v, x˜) for v ∈ (v˜ (x˜; vq, q) , vq) and v ≥ vq.
The committee is therefore equally well off or strictly worse off with x˜ < q depending on the realized
valence.
The next step is to provide a characterization of x˜ (vq, q). The committee’s modified objective
function is easily derived by beginning with Eq. 5 in the main text and substituting in v¯ (x˜; vq, q)
for v¯ (x˜; q) and vq − λc (xc − q) for −λc (xc − q). It is straightforward to show that the derivative
w.r.t. x˜ is then the product of two terms (1− F (v¯ (x˜; vq, q))) > 0 and
−H (v¯ (x˜; vq, q)) · λ′f (x) · ((λc (xc − q)− λc (xc − x)) + v¯ (x; q)) + λ
′
c (xc − x) . (13)
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It is also easily verified that Eq. 13 is very similar to Eq. 10 in the proof of Lemma 1 and in
particular satisfies all the properties of the latter used to prove the lemma. Hence Lemma 1 also
holds when vq > 0.
The final step is to argue that x˜ (vq, q) > x˜ (0, 0). We do this by arguing that x˜ (vq, q) > x˜ (0, qˆ),
where qˆ is the unique status quo qˆ ∈ (0, q) such that the floor is indifferent between (0, qˆ) and
(vq, q), i.e., −λf (qˆ) = vq − λf (q). Such a qˆ exists because the floor prefers (0, 0) to (vq, q). The
desired property then follows immediately since x˜ (0, qˆ) > x˜ (0, 0) by Proposition 2.
To show x˜ (vq, q) > x˜ (0, qˆ) we show Eq. 13 is strictly positive when evaluated at status quo
(vq, q) and proposal x˜ (0, qˆ), which means that, by reasoning similar to the reasoning for Lemma 1
in the main text, when the status quo is (vq, q) the committee is better off proposing a bill more
extreme than x˜ (0, qˆ). From Eq 13
−H (v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; vq, q)) · λ′f (x˜ (0, qˆ)) · ((λc (xc − q)− λc (xc − x˜ (0, qˆ))) + v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; q))
+λ
′
c (xc − x˜ (0, qˆ))
= 0 +H (v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ)) · λ′f (x˜ (0, qˆ)) · [v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ)− v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; q)] > 0.
The first equality holds by substituting the v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; vq, q) term inside H (·) with v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ),
substituting the v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; q) term with v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ)− (v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ)− v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; q)), multiplying
out, and using the optimality of x˜ (0, qˆ) at status quo (0, qˆ) to cancel terms. The second inequality
follows immediately from H (v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ)) · λ′f (x˜ (0, qˆ)) > 0 and from the fact that qˆ < q implies
v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; qˆ) > v¯ (x˜ (0, qˆ) ; q).
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Committee Composition
We consider a modified game sequence in which the floor first selects the committee’s ideal point
from a compact interval X¯.15 Proofs of the stated lemmas and propositions are deferred to the end
of this section because several accessory lemmas are required.
Without loss of generality we assume that xf = 0, X¯ = [0, x¯] with x¯ > 0, and q ≥ 0. As in the
baseline model it suffices to consider only committee appointments to the right of the floor, since
only the distance between the committee and the floor |xf − xc| determines the players’ equilibrium
payoffs.16 The upper bound x¯ may be thought of as the distance between the most extreme possible
committee appointee and the chamber median.
Transferable Valence
First, recall the definitions of q∗ and x¯c (q) from Proposition 1; x¯c (q) is the most extreme committee
for which the floor prefers a closed rule and specialization to an open rule absent specialization,
and λf (q∗) = E [v]. The following proposition then characterizes the floor’s optimal committee
appointments behavior.
Proposition 5 Suppose valence is transferable. The floor’s choice of committee is as follows.
Case 1 (Low Cost Specialization): If c ≤ E [v], the floor is indifferent over all appointments,
chooses an open rule, and the committee specializes.
15We analyze choice from a compact interval rather than a finite set of possible committee appointees for simplicity;
results in the latter case are qualitatively similar.
16When xc < 0 and q > 0, the equilibrium payoffs of the committee and the floor in each possible subgame (closed
or open rule) and for each possible valence type (transferable or nontransferable) are identical to those in which the
committee’s ideal point is −xc > 0. The only distinction in equilibrium is that realized spatial policy outcomes are
reflected about the floor’s ideal point.
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Case 2 (Costly Specialization, Extreme Status Quo): If c > E [v] and q ≥ q∗, the floor
is indifferent over appointments, chooses an open rule, and the committee does not specialize.
Case 3 (Costly Specialization, Moderate Status Quo): If c > E [v] and q < q∗, the floor
strictly prefers to appoint a preference outlier x∗c (q, c) > q and commit to closed rule if and only
if c ∈ (E [v] , ctcl (x¯c (q) , q)) . Otherwise the floor is indifferent over appointments, chooses an open
rule, and the committee does not specialize.
The proposition may be interpreted as follows. Suppose that c > E [v], so the value of valence
alone is insufficient to induce specialization. Then the floor may attempt to appoint a preference
outlier x∗c (q, c) > q and consider its legislation under a closed rule in order to induce specialization.
Committees who are preference outliers have a relatively greater incentive to specialize under a
closed rule because they benefit more from informal agenda power.
The floor will not attempt this strategy if the status quo point is too extreme, i.e. q > q∗, because
its ideological losses from a closed rule would be too great. However, if q is relatively moderate then
for intermediate levels of cost c ∈ (E [v] , ctcl (x¯c (q) , q)] there exist preference outliers x∗c (q, c) > q
who can be induced to specialize by being granted a closed rule, and are sufficiently moderate that
the floor is willing to do so. The floor’s choice of which preference outlier to appoint when pursuing
this approach is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Whenever the floor selects a closed rule in equilibrium, it appoints the most moderate
committee willing to specialize, i.e., the unique x∗c (q, c) satisfying ctcl (x
∗
c (q, c) , q) = c. The optimal
committee choice satisfies the following comparative statics.
1. Consider two possible specialization costs for c′ > c. If a closed rule would be chosen given
either cost, then the higher cost results in a more extreme appointee, i.e. x∗c (q, c′) > x∗c (q, c) .
2. Consider two possible status quos q′ > q. If a closed rule would be chosen given either status
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quo, then the more extreme status quo results in a more extreme appointee, i.e. x∗c (q′, c) >
x∗c (q, c).
Whenever the floor intends to use a restrictive rule to induce specialization, it appoints a com-
mittee no more extreme than necessary to induce specialization. This results in a straightforward
appointments dynamic. Because the committee’s value for specialization is decreasing in both its
formal agenda power (i.e. having an extreme q) and in the cost of specialization, increasing q and
c results in more extreme appointees being necessary to induce specialization.
Another feature to note is that the range of costs
(
E [v] , ctcl (x¯c (q) , q)
)
for which the floor
appoints a preference outlier and grants a closed rule shrinks as the status quo q becomes more
extreme. The reason is that this strategy becomes less effective at inducing specialization as q
increases. When q ≥ q∗, the floor ceases appointing outliers and simply selects an open rule.
Policy-Specific Valence
We now analyze the floor’s optimal committee appointment in the case of policy-specific valence.
Recall that policy-specific valence is inherently protected from expropriation regardless of the rule,
and that open rules are therefore superior for inducing specialization. As in the case of transferable
valence, preference outliers value specialization more, and hence the floor may need to appoint
preference outliers to induce specialization. However, because open rules are always chosen in
equilibrium, appointing outliers is much less costly: the floor always retains the right to discard the
valence generated in committee and amend the target policy to its own ideal point. This generates
the following appointments behavior.
Proposition 6 If valence is policy-specific, the floor’s choice of committee is as follows.
Case 1 (Low Cost Specialization): If c ≤ E [v], all appointees will specialize and an optimal
appointment is a centrist x∗c (c) = 0.
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Case 2 (Prohibitively Costly Specialization): If c > cnto (x¯), no appointee is willing to
specialize and the floor is indifferent over appointees.
Case 3 (Costly Specialization): If c ∈ (E [v] , cnto (x¯)], every optimal appointee is a prefer-
ence outlier, i.e. x∗c (c) > 0, and the selected appointee specializes.
In the previously-analyzed transferable valence game, the floor had an incentive to appoint
preference outliers to induce specialization, but this incentive was tempered by the need to relinquish
amendment power via a closed rule. In contrast, with policy-specific valence the incentive to appoint
outliers is unrestrained. The floor optimally induces specialization precisely by maintaining formal
amendment power, and thus if a centrist committee xc = 0 would not specialize then the floor is
better off appointing any preference outlier, however extreme, that would be willing to specialize.
The floor’s optimal committee appointment when it selects a preference outlier is characterized
in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Whenever the floor selects a preference outlier x∗c (c) > 0, it appoints a committee
working on the most moderate target policy x˜o (xc) from among the set willing to specialize, i.e.,
x∗c (c) ∈ argmin
{xc:cnto (xc,q)≥c}
{x˜o (xc)} The optimal appointee satisfies the following comparative statics.
1. If x∗c (c) is an optimal appointee at cost c but not at cost c′ > c, then every optimal appointee
for c′ is strictly more extreme, i.e. x∗c (c′) > x∗c (c).
2. If the derivative of committee’s spatial loss function λc (d) is concave, i.e. λ′′′c (d) ≤ 0, then
the optimal appointee x∗c (c) is unique, strictly increasing in c, and satisfies cnto (x∗c (c)) = c.
In the non-transferable valence game, the committee’s preferences influence the floor’s utility
only through the committee’s choice of the target policy x˜o (xc). Although the floor never accepts
a policy worse than its own ideal point absent valence, it is better off in expectation when the
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committee works on a more moderate target policy. Thus, the lemma states that the floor always
chooses an outlier to induce specialization if one who will do so exists, but then chooses the outlier
who would work on the most moderate target policy. This results in the set of optimal appointments
being weakly increasing in the cost of specialization.17 Finally, the lemma states that for a special
case of the committee’s loss function (including quadratic loss), the optimal appointee is simply
the most moderate one that would be willing to specialize.
Committee Composition Accessory Lemmas
Lemma 7 The closed rule cost cutpoints ctcl (xc, q) and c
nt
cl (xc, q) are continuous and satisfy,
1. ctcl (xc, q) = c
nt
cl (xc, q) = E [v] for xc ≤ q
2. ctcl (xc, q) and c
nt
cl (xc, q) are strictly increasing in xc for xc > q.
Proof. Transferable Valence: Continuity and part 1 of the lemma are easily established from
the definition in Eq. (3). To see strictly increasing, suppose x′c > xc ≥ q. If committee with
ideal point x′c specialized, it could follow the optimal proposal strategy of a committee with ideal
point xc and receive ex-ante expected utility E [v]−
∫ v¯(xc;q)
0 λc (x
′
c − x¯ (v; q)) f (v) dv. Hence its cost
cutpoint ctcl (xc, q), derived from its optimal proposal strategy, must be at least as large as,
E[v] +
∫ v¯(xc;q)
0
(λc(x′c − q)− λc(x′c − x¯(v; q)) f(v)dv + (1− F (v¯(xc; q)))λc(x′c − q)
> E[v] +
∫ v¯(xc;q)
0
(λc(xc − q)− λc(xc − x¯(v; q)) f(v)dv + (1− F (v¯(xc; q)))λc(xc − q)
= ctcl (xc, q) , where the inequality follows from the strict convexity of λc (·) .
17This is meant in a set-order sense, i.e., S (c) increasing in c i.f.f. for c′ > c, x′ ∈ S (c′) and x ∈ S (c) and x′ < x
→ x ∈ S (c′) and x′ ∈ S (c).
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Non-transferable valence: Continuity and part 1 of the lemma are easily established from the def-
inition in Eq. (6). To show (2), suppose x′c > xc ≥ q. It is straightforward to verify that if
a committee with ideal point x′c specialized and selected target policy x˜cl (xc, q) it would receive
strictly greater change in utility than a committee with ideal point xc. This suffices to show the
property. 
Lemma 8 If the committee’s loss function λc (·) is convex and its derivative λ′c (·) is weakly con-
cave, then x˜cl (xc, q) is strictly increasing in xc.
Proof. From Eq. 9 and Lemma 1, x˜cl (xc, q) is characterized by the first order condition,
(1− F (v¯ (x; q)))
(
−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) · (λc (xc − q)− λc (xc − x) + v¯ (x; q)) + λ
′
c (xc − x)
)
= 0.
To show that x˜cl (xc, q) is strictly increasing in xc, it suffices to show that the derivative of the term
in parentheses w.r.t. xc is strictly positive when evaluated at x˜cl (xc, q) ∈ (q, xc). This implies that
the cross partial in x and xc of the original objective function is strictly positive when evaluated at
the optimum, which generates the desired result.
First, it is straightforward to show that λc (xc − q)− λc (xc − x) can be rewritten as,
λc (xc − q)− λc (xc − x) = φ (x, xc, q) + (x− q) · λ′c (xc − x)
where
φ (x, xc, q) =
∫ x−q
0
(
λ′c (xc − x+ y)− λ′c (xc − x)
)
dy.
Clearly φ (x, xc, q) > 0 since λ′c (·) is an increasing function by the strict convexity of λc (·).
Now substitute this into the term in parentheses, which generates,
−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) ·
(
φ (x, xc, q) + (x− q) · λ′c (xc − x) + v¯ (x; q)
)
+ λ
′
c (xc − x)
=
(
1−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) · (x− q)
)
λ
′
c (xc − x)− H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) · (φ (x, xc, q) + v¯ (x; q))
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At the optimum x˜cl (xc, q), the above expression must equal to 0. Since H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) ·
(φ (x, xc, q) + v¯ (x; q)) > 0 and λ
′
c (xc − x) > 0 for all (x, xc, q), at the optimum it must also be the
case that
1−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) · (x− q)
∣∣
x=x˜cl(xc,q)
> 0
since otherwise the expression would be less than 0.
Now take the derivative of the rewritten first order condition with respect to xc and evaluate
at the optimum, which generates,
(
1−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) · (x− q)
)
λ′′c (xc − x)−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) ·
∂
∂ xc
(φ (x, xc, q))
∣∣∣∣
x=x˜cl(xc,q)
(14)
We show that Eq. 14 is strictly positive. Because 1−H (v¯ (x; q)) · λ′f (x) · (x− q)
∣∣
x=x˜cl(xc,q)
> 0
as shown above and λ′′c (xc − x) > 0 by convexity, a sufficient condition for Eq. 14 to be strictly
positive is that ∂∂ xc (φ (x, xc, q)) ≤ 0. Note that
∂
∂ xc
(φ (x, xc, q)) =
∂
∂ xc
(∫ x−q
0
(
λ′c (xc − x+ y)− λ′c (xc − x)
)
dy
)
=
∫ x−q
0
(
λ
′′
c (xc − x+ y)− λ
′′
c (xc − x)
)
dy.
Thus a sufficient condition for ∂∂ xc (φ (x, xc, q)) ≤ 0 is that λ
′′
c (·) is weakly decreasing, which is
equivalent to λ′c (·) being weakly concave. This completes the proof, and the condition clearly holds
for a quadratic loss function λc (d) = α · d2, because λ′′c (d) = 2α.
Main Committee Composition Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5. Case 1: Suppose c ≤ E [v] = cto (xc) ∀xc ∈ X¯. Then any appointee
would invest under either rule, the floor selects an open rule for all committees, and its utility from
any appointment is E [v]. Hence it is indifferent over all appointments.
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Cases 2 and 3: It is assumed throughout this section that c > E [v]. This implies three
things: (i) no committee specializes under an open rule, (ii) the floor’s utility from appointing any
committee and choosing an open rule is identical and equal to 0, and (iii) the floor strictly prefers
to appoint any committee for whom it selects a closed rule to any committee for whom it selects
an open rule.
To prove case 2, suppose q ≥ q∗. Then by Proposition 1 the floor selects an open rule for all
committees, no committee specializes, and the floor is therefore indifferent over appointments.
To prove case 3, suppose q < q∗. Then by Proposition 1 the set of committees for whom the floor
strictly prefers a closed rule and specialization to an open rule and no specialization is nonempty
and equal to [0, x¯c (q)). In addition, the set of appointees who specialize under a closed rule given
cost c is,
S (c) =
{
xc ∈ X¯ : ctcl (xc, q) ≥ c
}
.
Now consider the case where c ∈ (E [v] , ctcl (x¯c (q) , q)). Then S (c) is nonempty and equal to
[x∗c (q, c) , x¯], where x∗c (q, c) is uniquely defined by ctcl (x
∗
c (q, c) , q) = c. In addition, x
∗
c (q, c) ∈
(q, x¯c (q)). These properties follow immediately from c > E [v], ctcl (q, q) = E [v] , and c
t
cl (xc, q)
strictly increasing in xc over xc ≥ q as shown in Lemma 7. By Proposition 1, the set of committees
for whom the floor selects a closed rule is [0, x¯c (q)) ∩ [x∗c (q, c) , x¯], which is non-empty and equal
to [x∗c (q, c) , x¯c (q)]. The optimal appointee therefore comes from this set. Finally, the optimal
appointee must be the set’s most moderate member x∗c (q, c), since the floor’s utility with a closed
rule and specialization is strictly decreasing in the committee’s ideal point by Lemma 3.
Finally, consider the case where c > ctcl (x¯c (q) , q). If S (c) is empty then we are done, since no
committee would specialize under a closed rule. If S (c) is nonempty then the set of committees
for whom the floor selects a closed rule is [0, x¯c (q)) ∩ [x∗c (q, c) , x¯] = ∅, since c > ctcl (x¯c (q) , q) and
S (c) non-empty imply x¯c (q) < x∗c (q, c).
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Proof of Lemma 5. The proof of the characterization is contained in the proof of Proposition
5. To prove the first comparative static, if a closed rule is selected for both c and c′, then we must
have x∗c (q, c′) > x∗c (q, c) since ctcl (xc, q) is strictly increasing in xc for xc > x
∗
c (q, c) > q.
To prove the second comparative static, if a closed rule is selected for both q and q′, then
ctcl
(
x∗c
(
q′, c
)
, q
)
> ctcl
(
x∗c
(
q′, c
)
, q′
)
= c
since ctcl (xc, q) is strictly decreasing in q when q ∈ [0, xc] and q < q′ < x∗c (q′, c). This then implies
that the x∗c (q, c) satisfying ctcl (x
∗
c (q, c) , q) = c must be strictly less than x
∗
c (q
′, c), since ctcl (xc, q)
is strictly increasing in xc over xc > x∗c (q′, c) > q′ > q and therefore strictly greater than c for all
xc ≥ x∗c (q′, c).
Proof of Proposition 6. Case 1: When c ≤ E [v], every appointee would specialize since
cnto (0) = E [v] and c
nt
o (xc) is strictly increasing in xc. The target policy chosen by a centrist is
x˜o (0) = 0, so this must be an optimal appointment.
Cases 2 and 3: Suppose c > E [v]. Recall that by Proposition 3 an open rule is selected for all
parameters. Thus the floor’s utility from no specialization is 0, and its utility from specialization
when the target policy is x˜ is V nto (x˜) = V (0, x˜) =
∫∞
v¯(x˜;0) (v − λf (x˜)) f (v) dv > 0. Thus regardless
of the target policy the floor strictly prefers specialization to no specialization, because under an
open rule the floor need only accept the committee’s bill for realizations of valence that make it
strictly better off than its own ideal point with no valence.
The set of committees who specialize is,
S (c) =
{
xc ∈ X¯ : cnto (xc) ≥ c
}
Note that c > E [v], cnto (0) = E [v] , and c
nt
o (0) is strictly increasing in xc. These together imply
that S (c) is non-empty if and only if c ≤ cnto (x¯), and that if S (c) is non-empty then it is equal
to [xˆc (c) , x¯], where xˆc (c) > 0 is the unique committee ideal point indifferent between investing
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and not investing, i.e. cnto (xˆc (c)) = c. Since c
nt
o (xc) = c
nt
cl (xc, 0), by Lemma 7 c
nt
o (xc) is strictly
increasing in xc, which implies xˆc (c) is strictly increasing in c for c ∈
(
0, cnto (x¯)
)
.
If S (c) is empty then the floor is indifferent over all appointments. If S (c) is non-empty then any
optimal appointment must be a member of S (c), because the floor strictly prefers any committee
who specializes to one who does not. Finally, by Lemma 3 when the committee specializes the
floor’s utility is V (0, x˜o (xc)). Since V (·) is strictly decreasing in its second argument (the target
policy), if S (c) is nonempty then the set of optimal appointments is,
X∗nt (c) = arg min
xc∈[xˆc(c),x¯]
{x˜o (xc)}
or the specializing committee (or committees) that choose the most moderate target policy.
We now complete the proof. For case 2, c > cnto (x¯)→ S (c) = ∅. For case 3, if c ∈ (E [v] , cnto (x¯)]
then S (c) is nonempty. Every optimal appointment must come from S (c) = [xˆc (c) , x¯] when it is
nonempty. 
Proof of Lemma 6. The characterization is simply a restatement of the characterization in
the proof of Proposition 6. We now prove the two comparative statics.
Part 1: If x∗c (c) is an optimal appointment given c, then the appointee chooses the most
moderate target policy among the set of specializers, i.e. x˜o (x∗c (c)) ≤ x˜o (xc) ∀xc ∈ S (c). Since
S (c′) ⊂ S (c), x∗c (c) also chooses the most moderate target policy among S (c′). Then x∗c (c) not
optimal for c′ implies S (c′) 6= ∅ (since then all appointments are optimal) and x∗c (c) 6∈ S (c′).
Hence x∗c (c) < S (c′). Since every optimal appointment comes from S (c′) when it is non-empty,
this completes the proof.
Part 2: If λc (d) has a concave derivative then x˜o (xc) is strictly increasing in xc by Lemma 8.
Hence argminxc∈[xˆc(c),x¯] {x˜o (xc)} = xˆc (c).
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Committee-Transferable Valence
We will use the term committee-transferable valence to refer to valence that is transferable by
the committee but not expropriable by the floor. With a closed rule and committee-transferable
valence, the model functions exactly like the closed rule model with transferable valence in the
main text of our paper. With an open rule and committee-transferable valence, the model can be
treated as a special case of the closed rule transferable valence game, with q = 0.
We show that the committee’s gain from investment in valence is strictly higher under an open
rule than under a closed rule, and that conditional on the committee investing the floor is strictly
better off under an open rule. Thus, as in the case of policy-specific valence, the floor always
chooses an open rule.
Committee investment With a closed rule, the committee’s gain from investment, from Eq. 3
in the main text, is
E[v] +
∫ v¯(xc;q)
0
(λc(xc − q)− λc(xc − x¯(v; q)) f(v)dv + (1− F (v¯(xc; q)))λc(xc − q).
Because v¯(xc; 0) > v¯(xc; q), i.e., it takes more valence to get the floor to go along with a bill at xc
if the status quo is 0 rather than q > 0, we can rewrite this as
E[v]+
∫ v¯(xc;q)
0
(λc(xc−q)−λc(xc−x¯(v; q)) f(v)dv+
∫ v¯(xc;0)
v¯(xc;q)
λc(xc−q) f(v)dv+
∫ ∞
v¯(xc;0)
λc(xc−q) f(v)dv.
(15)
With an open rule, the committee’s gain from investment is characterized by substituting in q = 0
to Eq. 3, which gives
E[v] +
∫ v¯(xc;0)
0
(λc(xc)− λc(xc − x¯(v; 0)) f(v)dv + (1− F (v¯(xc; 0)))λc(xc).
Because v¯(xc; 0) > v¯(xc; q), we can rewrite this as
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E[v]+
∫ v¯(xc;q)
0
(λc(xc)−λc(xc−x¯(v; 0)) f(v)dv+
∫ v¯(xc;0)
v¯(xc;q)
(λc(xc)−λc(xc−x¯(v; 0)) f(v)dv+
∫ ∞
v¯(xc;0)
λc(xc) f(v)dv.
(16)
To compare the committee’s incentives under the two rules, we compare Eqs. 15 and 16 term by
term, noting that the first term is identical and each of the subsequent terms is strictly greater
for the open rule. For the second term, note that by strict concavity of the floor’s utility function
x¯(v; q) − q < x¯(v; 0) − 0 so by strict concavity of the committee’s utility function, λc(xc − q) −
λc(xc − x¯(v; q)) < λc(xc)− λc(xc − x¯(v; 0)), and thus the second term is strictly greater in Eq. 16
than in Eq. 15. A similar argument applies to the third term. By strict concavity of the floor’s
utility function we again have x¯(v; q) − q < x¯(v; 0) − 0 but since v > v¯(xc; q) the committee now
refers xc < x¯ (v; q); hence xc − q < x¯ (v; q) − q < x¯(v; 0) − 0. Again applying strict concavity of
the committee’s utility function, λc(xc − q) < λc(xc)− λc(xc − x¯(v; 0)). Finally, the fourth term is
strictly greater in Eq. 16 because the committee’s loss function is strictly increasing and 0 < q < xc.
Floor utility We now show that if the committee invests in valence, the floor has a strictly
higher expected utility under the open rule. To do this we show that for any realized valence the
floor is at least as well off and for some realizations it is strictly better off under the open rule. For
v ∈ [0, v¯(xc; q)], the committee proposes a bill that leaves the floor indifferent between the bill and
either the status quo (0, q) in the case of a closed rule or (0, 0) in the case of an open rule. Because
the floor prefers (0, 0) over (0, q) it is better off under the open rule. For v ∈ [v¯(xc; q), v¯(xc; 0)], the
committee proposes (v, xc) under a closed rule or (v, x¯(v; 0)) under an open rule. Since x¯(v; 0) < xc
the floor strictly prefers the open rule. For v > v¯(xc; 0) the rule choice has no effect on the floor’s
utility because the committee proposes (v, xc) under either rule.
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